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Abstract 
This article explores the association between intergenerational social mobility and attitudes 
toward income differences in post-socialist societies. I hypothesise that based on the 
psychological mechanism of self-serving bias in causal attribution, those who experience 
upward social mobility are more likely to support greater income differences, and that 
subjective intergenerational mobility has stronger association with attitudes toward income 
differences than objective mobility because individuals filter their objective environment in 
order to derive their subjective perceptions of the world and their own experiences. The 
described hypotheses are tested with two cross-national datasets – European Values Studies 
(EVS) and Life in Transition Survey (LITS). The derived findings are robust to alternative 
statistical specifications and indicate that individuals who perceive themselves as subjectively 
mobile have indeed significantly different attitudes toward income differences in comparison 
to non-mobile groups, but that this effect is not manifested among objectively mobile 
individuals.  
 
Keywords: Intergenerational mobility, subjective mobility, public attitudes, income 
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Introduction 
Scholars have long hypothesized that intergenerational social mobility has implications for 
individual attitudes and behaviours (Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, & Heath, 1995; Turner, 1992; 
Wilensky & Edwards, 1959). Existing research on this topic is mostly limited to Western 
welfare democracies, and the findings are far from being conclusive. Many authors, using 
various datasets and research designs, have found that upward mobility negatively associates 
with redistribution preferences (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Schmidt, 2011; Shariff, 2015; 
Siedler & Sonnenberg, 2012); while others have found no, or even negative, associations (e.g. 
Guillaud 2013; Clark & D’Angelo 2010). Although the earlier years of socialist rule show 
movement to more prestigious occupational categories as an idealized goal, the consequences 
associated with individuals’ experiences of social mobility are probably one of the most 
under-researched areas of intergenerational socialist and post-socialist stratification systems 
(Inglot, 2013; Wegren, O’Brien, & Patsiorkovski, 2006). Studying the links between social 
mobility and freely expressed attitudes and behaviour of a social and political nature was 
clearly problematic in the socialist context, because political, economic and civil society 
activities were severely restricted, if not completely blocked. This means that if social 
mobility had any influence on individuals’ political and economic actions, manifestations of 
the effect would have been difficult to observe.  
Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, changes from one-party rule to electoral 
democracy, together with increased availability of survey data, provide new opportunities to 
observe the consequences of intergenerational social mobility in post-socialist societies. It is 
reasonable to assume that there are additional implications of the experience of social 
mobility, other than simply individuals’ own levels of satisfaction, or normative assessments 
of the process by third parties such as social scientists (Swift, 2004). For instance, it has been 
suggested that high levels of social mobility may consolidate the stability of a political 
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regime, through enhancing loyal behaviour of the lower and middle classes (Leventoglu, 
2013). Furthermore, existing studies indicate that attitudes toward inequality, redistribution 
and welfare state programmes significantly vary across post-socialist societies (Gugushvili, 
2015b; Habibov, 2012a, 2012b; Lipsmeyer, 2004) and that the countries of the former Soviet 
Union display a significantly lower preference for greater income equality than other Central 
and Eastern European post-socialist societies1 (Cojocaru, 2014; Murthi & Tiongson, 2009). In 
this article, I speculate that one of the factors why newly independent states of the former 
Soviet Union exert less egalitarian attitudes is due to their higher intergenerational social 
mobility levels than those observed in other post-socialist societies. Existing studies suggest 
that the Central and Eastern European EU member states such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, 
and Czech Republic are characterised by the low intergenerational mobility levels, while the 
most intergenerationally mobile countries are the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Belarus, 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Estonia and Lithuania (Gugushvili, 2015a; Veraschagina, 2012). 
To explore the association between intergenerational social mobility and attitudes 
toward income differences, this article employs an important social-psychological concept as 
the main pillar of its theoretical framework, namely the self-serving bias in causal attribution. 
The self-serving bias implies that individuals are more likely to attribute failures to factors 
that are beyond their control, or situational factors, and are more likely to explain success by 
pointing to their own merits, abilities and efforts, or dispositional factors (Semin & Zwier, 
1997). Depending on their origin, individuals start with an initial set of attitudes, but over 
time these preferences are amended, based on personal experiences of social mobility and on 
                                                          
1 The Soviet Union consisted of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
Other post-socialist countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and 
Serbia.     
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an associated self-serving perception of the role played by ascribed and attained factors in 
determining life chances and inequalities (Piketty, 1995). The upwardly mobile are likely to 
support income differences because they tend to overestimate their individual contributions to 
success and failure, therefore perceiving existing inequalities as just. Downwardly mobile 
individuals, on the other hand, support the reduction of inequality, because they tend to 
assign a greater weight to external factors in shaping their life course, and are therefore more 
likely to think that society as a whole should be responsible for narrowing the existing gap 
between the rich and the poor. The main research question of this article asks if the outlined 
theoretical links between intergenerational social mobility and attitudes toward income 
differences take place in post-socialist transition societies. 
This study not only contributes to literature on the consequences of social mobility for 
egalitarian attitudes, but also simultaneously considers the effects of both objective 
intergenerational occupational mobility and subjective self-reported mobility experience on 
attitudes toward income differences. The latter distinction is important inasmuch as mobility 
experience might have implications for individuals’ attitudes if they are aware of 
experiencing downward or upward mobility. To this end, European Values Studies (EVS) 
and the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) datasets are employed simultaneously because when 
used alone neither survey provides a possibility for comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
objective and subjective social mobility. The next section starts with a review of how rational 
self-interest, the principles of distributive justice, the self-serving bias in causal attribution, 
and social mobility experiences can explain individuals’ varying attitudes toward income 
differences across post-socialist societies. Unlike most studies on the subject, the employed 
literature mainly derives from scholarship in social and cross-cultural comparative 
psychology. In the research design section particular attention is paid to independent 
variables because the article consecutively analyses the effect of two distinct explanatory 
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factors, subjective and objective social mobility, on attitudes toward income differences. The 
results section presents findings from bivariate and multivariate analysis and additional 
robustness checks. The final section of this article summarises the findings, discusses 
possible causal mechanisms, and speculates about their implications for the realm of policy 
and future research.    
 
  
Theoretical framework 
There is a consensus in current academic and policy literature that the transition faced in 
post-socialist countries has increased inequality in income distribution, which in turn has led 
to significant changes in attitudes toward income differences (Alam et al., 2005). The 
evidence available suggests that despite the growing trend of individualisation and 
marketization of existing public welfare provisions, overall support for redistribution has 
remained high in post-socialist societies (Habibov, 2012b). At the same time, the analysis of 
three waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) indicates that individuals in the former 
Soviet republics (for the list of countries, please refer to Footnote 1) exert a significantly 
lower preference for greater income equality than do individuals in Eastern Europe and even 
in some developed societies (Murthi & Tiongson, 2009). One possible reason why former 
Soviet republics demonstrate more inegalitarian attitudes toward income differences could be 
their historically high levels of intergenerational social mobility in comparison to other post-
socialist societies (Gugushvili, 2014; Parkin, 1973). Before empirically testing if attitudes 
toward income differences among individuals indeed vary with their social mobility 
experiences, the theoretical foundations of this association first need to be discussed. 
 
Self-interest, distributive justice, and self-serving bias in causal attribution 
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Preferences for income differences are likely determined by myriad of economic, institutional 
and behavioural factors (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004), self-interest, however, can be considered 
as one of the most important mechanisms (Linos & West, 2003). Scholars generally find that 
welfare attitudes are largely affected by social risks and people’s expectations regarding their 
income streams in a hypothetical free market environment (Duman, 2009). If individuals 
believe that their wellbeing is uncertain behind “the veil of ignorance,” then they tend to be 
more supportive of social policy investments (Iversen & Soskice, 2001). Similarly, class 
membership and socio-economic status are decisive determinants of attitudes toward 
redistribution (Armingeon, 2006). The role of self-interest in redistribution preferences is 
evident in relation to specific welfare programmes. For instance, educational expenses are 
mostly directed to the youth because children and young adults attend primary, secondary and 
tertiary educational institutions, therefore, the allocation of funds in this area would likely 
lead to support of greater investment among young adults (Busemeyer, 2012). At the other 
extreme of an age-defined welfare programme is a pension system that elicits stronger 
support from the elderly because it targets people who reach a defined retirement threshold 
(Busemeyer, Goerres, & Weschle, 2009; Gugushvili, 2015b). 
The logic of self-interest is also clear from an intragenerational perspective. Among 
the various welfare dimensions, socio-economic foundations for preferences of pro-poor 
policies are most evident. Social need is determined by levels of material deprivation and is 
addressed using redistributive measures directed to poor individuals. Therefore, the 
beneficiaries of egalitarian policies—individuals with lower incomes—are the strongest 
supporters of these redistributive measures. Nonetheless, the justification of redistribution is 
far from being homogenous even within recipient groups, and especially among net tax 
contributors. It has been convincingly argued and demonstrated that one of the main reasons 
why preferences on redistribution vary is due to a heterogeneous system of justice beliefs 
7 
(Sabbagh & Vanhuysse, 2006). In turn, the principles of distributive justice are central 
components of justice beliefs that may define: (a) the values underlying the rules governing 
distribution – injustice of values; (b) the rules which are employed to represent the values – 
injustice of rules; (c) the ways that rules are implemented – injustice of implementation; and 
(d) the ways decisions are made about any of the foregoing – injustice of decision-making 
procedures (Deutsch 1975, p. 138). The analysis of data from 14 cultures indicates a strong 
relationship between the principles of distributive justice and support for the social provisions 
of basic needs (Shirazi & Biel, 2005).  
An individual’s principles of distributive justice are closely related to the cultural 
context and idiosyncratic country characteristics in which the respondent is nested (Kluegel et 
al., 1995). This is demonstrated by existing survey data in post-socialist countries (Habibov, 
2012). Research also indicates that “sociotropic” assessments of the environment have a 
strong impact on political attitudes (Kluegel & Mason, 2004). One important social-
psychological concept that may explain why socially mobile individuals might differ in their 
preferences for distributive justice, namely the self-serving bias in causal attribution. Causal 
attribution refers to “the process by which social perceivers arrive at causal explanations for 
their own, as well as others’ behaviours” (Semin & Zwier 1997, p. 55). The self-serving bias 
implies that people are more likely to attribute failure to factors that are beyond their control 
and explain successes by pointing to their own merits, abilities and effort. According to 
Miller and Ross (1975), the self-serving bias is related to individuals’ need to have control 
over their environment: “the attribution to self of success and the attribution to external 
factors of failure provides for the continuation of control attempts” (p. 23). A meta-analysis 
of 266 separate studies confirms the pervasiveness of the self-serving attribution bias in the 
general population in various setting and countries and also demonstrates significant 
variability across various societal groups (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).  
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Hypotheses 
After a short discussion of the role played by self-interest in distributive justice principles and 
the self-serving bias in causal attribution, we can relate social mobility to attitudes toward 
income differences. It is known that while some individuals in a society believe that 
predetermined circumstances are more decisive than one’s own effort in shaping life 
achievements, others are convinced that individual effort rather than ascribed circumstances 
is the key to seizing chances in life. Piketty’s (1995) intra-family theoretical model assumes 
that these perceptions are largely affected by life-long experiences. Depending on their origin, 
individuals start with an initial set of attitudes, but over time these preferences are amended 
based on their experiences of intergenerational mobility and an associated self-serving 
perception of the role ascribed and attained factors play in determining success or failure. 
What this means is that individuals who experience upward social mobility will be more 
likely than non-mobile individuals to make internal attributions (such as effort and hard 
work) to describe individual success. We should expect downwardly mobile individuals to be 
more in favour of the notion that individuals are not accountable for their own failure or 
success and to make external attributions.  
Not only do mobile individuals have different perspectives on the causal determinants 
of success and failure in life, they are also more likely to express different attitudes than non-
mobile individuals toward income differences. The upwardly mobile are likely to support 
income differences because, based on the self-serving bias in causal attribution, they tend to 
overestimate their individual contributions to success and failure, therefore perceive existing 
inequalities as just. On the other hand, downwardly mobile individuals are expected to 
support reducing inequality because they tend to assign a greater weight to external factors in 
shaping their life course and are therefore more likely to think that society as a whole is 
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responsible for narrowing the existing gap between the rich and the poor. This is in line with 
the empirical evidence presented by Wegner (1991) that shows that mobility experience 
correlates with individuals’ feelings of being justly or unjustly compensated. Not only does 
social mobility affect individuals’ preferred principles of distributive justice and their related 
views on inequalities, it also changes their propensity of being net beneficiaries (downward 
mobile) and net contributors (upward mobile) in policies associated with resource 
redistribution. Based on self-interest calculations of redistributive taxation, an empirical 
analysis of the links between mobility and attitudes is important to account for individuals’ 
socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The first hypothesis of this article 
takes the following form: 
  
Hypothesis 1: Intergenerational upward (downward) social mobility is negatively (positively) 
associated with egalitarian attitudes. 
 
Since my empirical analysis deals with the links between social mobility and attitudes, an 
important distinction to make here is the separation of objective occupational mobility and 
subjective perceptions of the intergenerational social mobility experience. It is true that self-
serving bias in causal attribution is conventionally defined as a cognitive response to a set of 
objective conditions; nevertheless individuals’ subjective perception of mobility can also be 
based on imagined obstacles or facilitating factors in the process of intergenerational 
mobility. If objective social mobility can be measured by the extend of the association 
between social background and occupational attainment, then subjective approaches to social 
mobility are based on respondents’ perceptions of how well they have done in life in 
comparison to their parents. It is often assumed that objective social mobility almost 
exclusively determines an individual’s subjective perception of mobility. Relationships 
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between subjective and objective mobility are generally, but not always, positive. For 
instance, some international migrants define their mobility experience as upward, which 
would qualify as downward according to objective definitions of social mobility (Segura, 
1989). Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that subjective mobility is correlated with a 
broader set of factors (Kelley & Kelley, 2009). Inconsistencies between subjective 
perceptions of mobility and objective mobility experience are attributed to people’s tendency 
to consider their own success in broader terms than occupational attainment (Duru-Bellat & 
Kieffer, 2008). 
Subjective social mobility in post-socialist countries is relevant in at least two 
particular regards. First of all, the economic recession of the 1990s generated a much stronger 
perception of subjective (mostly downward) social mobility than in terms of objective 
occupational mobility (Kreidl, 2000). On the other hand, subjective mobility indeed appears 
to have had a stronger effect on individuals’ attitudes than objective mobility (Turner, 1992). 
The effects of social mobility on individuals’ worldviews might be relevant only if they are 
aware of experiencing upward or downward social mobility. One particular psychological 
explanation of this tendency suggests that individuals tend to filter their objective 
environment in order to derive their subjective perceptions of the world and their own 
experiences (Wolf, 1978). Furthermore, Baer et al. (1976) argued that the use of subjective 
social mobility measures minimizes the criticism of objective status mobility research, which 
is unable to determine whether or not the effect stems from status inconsistencies or a 
particular occupational status. 
One important aspect in which objective and subjective measures are likely to differ 
could be underlying personality characteristics of individuals. Datasets analysed in this study 
suggest that objective mobility is more homogeneous than subjective social mobility across 
post-socialist societies, and, as we will see in the research design section, far less subjectively 
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mobile individuals declare that they have done much better in life than their parents. Those 
individuals who are characterised by higher levels of optimism, regardless of their actual 
social mobility experience, are more likely to consider themselves upwardly mobile, which in 
turn can also be responsible for egalitarian attitudes which are analysed in this article. In 
clinical psychology research, optimism has been related to higher levels of subjective well-
being in times of adversity or difficulty. With this in mind, perhaps mobile individuals, due to 
their positive perspectives on life, believe that a lack of hard work, skills and ability are 
responsible for failure in life (Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010). To summarise, based on 
an empirical review of the literature and theoretical considerations, it is expected that social 
mobility has statistically significant links with preferences for income differences and that 
this association is particularly pronounced among subjectively mobile individuals. The 
second hypothesis takes the following form: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The association of intergenerational social mobility with egalitarian attitudes 
outlined in Hypothesis 1 is stronger for subjective perception of mobility rather than 
objective occupational mobility. 
 
 
Research Design  
 
Datasets 
This section describes the dependent, independent and control variables, which were used in 
this study to make the most accurate interpretation as possible of the existing datasets via 
bivariate and multivariate analysis. I use two complementary cross-national surveys – EVS 
and LITS – as a basis for the empirical analysis of data from the following 21 post-socialist 
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societies: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Ukraine.2 Montenegro is excluded because it was not an 
independent state when LITS survey was initiated, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is excluded 
because of complicated socio-political arrangements.3  
The most recent wave of EVS, conducted in 2008, provides detailed information on 
respondents’ social origin and occupational attainment and is used when looking at links 
between objective social mobility and attitudes toward income differences (EVS, 2010). EVS 
is a large-scale, cross-national survey covering a wide range of attitudes, opinions and values, 
and has been repeated every nine years since 1981. EVS was administered in the appropriate 
national language(s). Face-to-face interviews in each country were conducted using a 
representative, multi-stage (or stratified) random sample of the adult population, who were, at 
the time of the interviews, 18 years or older. The total number of completed interviews stood 
at around 1,500 respondents per country. Significant efforts were undertaken to guarantee 
high scientific quality standards and a special Theory Group ensured that the survey 
questions were appropriately standardised between countries. 
The second wave of LITS, conducted in 2010, serves mainly as a source for the 
empirical analysis of the implications of subjective social mobility on individuals’ attitudes. 
LITS covers all societies of interest to the present analysis and contains representative 
samples of the adult populations in each nation, derived from a two-stage sampling method 
                                                          
2 Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan are not included in EVS dataset and cannot be compared in terms of the implications of 
objective and subjective social mobility. 
3 The central government's power in Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly limited because the country is 
effectively divided into two parts – Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
while the third region, the Brčko District, is governed locally. 
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that used census enumeration areas as primary sampling units and households as secondary 
sampling units. The net sample size was approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews per 
country. In most post-socialist countries, females and relatively older respondents dominated 
the datasets, a result of other such household members being away on a permanent basis, 
either for work or study. LITS does not provide weights to correct for this bias and hence 
weighting is not used in the descriptive and bivariate analysis.4 The quality of the employed 
datasets is validated by their extensive application in comparative social and political science 
research (Cojocaru, 2014; Dabalen, Parinduri, & Paul, 2015; Gugushvili, 2015a, 2015b; 
Habibov, 2012b, 2016; Verbakel, 2012). For more information regarding EVS and LITS 
consult the surveys’ official websites.5 
 
Dependent and independent variables 
Our dependent variable assesses individuals’ preferences for income differences. In both EVS 
and LITS surveys, the respondents are asked an identical question and to place their views on 
a 10-point scale: “Incomes should be made more equal”=1 versus “we need larger income 
differences”=10. The mean values of this variable are 5.7 (SD 3.0) in EVS and 4.6 (SD 3.0) 
in LITS. This difference could be a result of the 2008 economic crisis and corresponding 
growth in more egalitarian attitudes toward income distribution in 2010 across post-socialist 
societies.  
                                                          
4 EVS provides appropriate weights for country specific characteristics, but the descriptive results 
reported in the empirical section of this article are substantively similar whether or not EVS weights 
are employed. The problem of over-representation of females and relatively older respondents in the 
multivariate analysis is addressed by means of controlling for respondents’ gender, age and labour 
market characteristics.   
5 For EVS refer to www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu, and EVS refer to 
http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/special-reports/life-in-transition-survey-ii.html.  
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 The central explanatory factor employed in this article is intergenerational social 
mobility experienced by respondents across post-socialist societies. EVS gives information 
about the Standard International Socio-economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) 
(Ganzeboom, De Graaf, & Treiman, 1992). The main advantage of this schema is that it 
scales and hierarchically ranks occupations according to the average level of education and 
job earnings. ISEI scores vary from 16 to 90. Respondents are asked about parental 
occupations when they were around 14 years old, and if their parents have different ISEI 
scores then the higher level occupational position is assigned (Erikson, 1984). We have to be 
cautious of a “ceiling” and “floor” effect in our models meaning that those respondents who 
started from extremely low or extremely high ISEI scores are limited in their ability to 
experience social mobility in either direction. Therefore, I eliminate from the analysis those 
respondents whose parents scored less than ISEI 22 (about 16% of observations with ISEI 
scores) and more than ISEI 70 (about 5% of observations with ISEI scores). 
 There are several alternative ways to operationalize social mobility according to the 
ISEI status of the respondents and their parents. A straightforward approach that entails 
subtracting respondents’ ISEI scores from their parents’ ISEI scores provides a continuous 
measure of social mobility. LITS, however, only enables the investigation of the categorical 
social mobility variable; hence I transformed the derived continuous variable into a 
categorical measure of mobility with five potential outcomes. I coded those respondents who 
stayed within –5 and +5 margin of change in intergenerational ISEI score as non-mobile 
(28% of the sample). This is a reasonable assumption because a ±5 change in ISEI score 
should also not imply a consequential transformation of a respondent’s status. On the upper 
end of mobility, those who increased ISEI within a range of 6-20 and 21-72 were classified as 
upward mobile (28% of the sample) and strongly upward mobile (21% of the sample), 
respectively. Meanwhile, those who had experienced a decrease within a margin of –6 to –20 
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and –21 to –72 were classified as downward mobile (15% of the sample) and strongly 
downward mobile (8% of the sample), respectively. 14.6% of respondents for whom 
information on ISEI scores are not available are excluded from the analysis.  
Unlike EVS, LITS is limited in terms of providing information on the socioeconomic 
status of respondents and their parents and does not enable the calculation of robust measures 
of objective social mobility. Nonetheless, both LITS ask respondents whether they agree or 
disagree with the following statement: “I have done better in life than my parents.” From a 5-
point Likert scale respondents can choose “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neither disagree 
nor agree,” “agree” or “strongly agree.” Respondents are further instructed to compare their 
parents’ position to their own when the former were the same age as them at the time of the 
interview. The answers from this question are transformed into five categorical variables: 
strongly disagree = strongly downward mobile (9% of the sample), disagree = downward 
mobile (21% of the sample), neither disagree nor agree = non-mobile (24% of the sample), 
agree = upward mobile (37% of the sample), and strongly agree = strongly upward mobile 
(10% of the sample). The main difference between objective and subjective social mobility is 
that the share of subjectively mobile individuals who are defined as non-mobile (23.5%) and 
strongly upward mobile (9.8%) is much lower than the share of objectively mobile 
individuals in the same mobility categories (30.4% vs. 19.4%, respectively).  
 
Control variables 
One of the goals of this article is to compare the effects of objective and subjective social 
mobility on attitudes toward income differences. For this purpose, similar control variables 
must be accounted for in models from different datasets. Unfortunately, some of the variables 
that have been identified as important covariates in earlier research such as social class, 
ideological preferences and religiosity, are not simultaneously available in both EVS and 
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LITS surveys or are available in slightly different forms; therefore, an accurate comparison is 
difficult to attain. For this reason, in the main analysis the control variables are limited in the 
default models to basic demographic and labour market characteristics.  
The following socio-demographic variables are accounted for and are expected to be 
associated with the dependent variable: gender (male=42.9% in EVS and 38.3% in LITS); 
age of respondent (mean=43.6 [SD 16.8] in EVS and 50.7 [SD 16.4] in LITS), age of 
respondent squared and divided by 100.6 The highest level of completed education is based 
on the 1997 version of International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 
(UNESCO, 1997), which varies from values of ISCED 0 – pre-primary education to ISCED 6 
– second stage of tertiary education (mean=3.4 [SD 1.1] in EVS and 4.2 [SD 1.4] in LITS). 
Dummy variables for the following types of labour market status were also created: employed 
which serves as a reference category includes individuals who worked for income during the 
past 12 months prior to interview (55.6% in EVS and 45.6% in LITS); unemployed consists 
of individuals who were not employed but were looking for a job or were interested in 
finding one (10.9% in EVS and 12.4% in LITS); students (7.3% in EVS and 3.0 in LITS); 
retired (18.6% in EVS and 25.3% in LITS); other labour market statuses include 
homemakers (absolute majority of whom are females), disabled people, those who do not 
want to work, have no need to work or cannot find suitable jobs, and any other outstanding 
category  (7.5% in EVS and 13.6% in LITS). Country dummies are used to account for 
country-specific characteristics in regression analysis. 
For the robustness check of the baseline analysis, however, I include additional 
control variables that are only available either in EVS or LITS datasets and might be 
                                                          
6 Age squared variable enables the detection of possible curvilinear effects stemming from different 
age cohorts, while its division by 100 simplifies a comparison of the results with the main age 
variable. 
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associated with the dependent variable. In EVS, I account for the size of settlement (1=under 
2,000, 10= 500,000 and more, mean= 4.6 [SD 2.6]), respondents’ socio-economic index of 
occupational status (16=lowest status, 90=highest status, mean=43.5 [SD 16.6]), and monthly 
household income corrected for purchasing power parity in thousands of euros (0.00=lowest 
income, 14.7=highest income, mean=0.81 [SD 0.90]). For subjective social mobility, I 
control for the type of settlement (1=urban, 0=otherwise, mean=0.47 [SD 0.50]), subjective 
socio-economic status (1=lowest, 10=highest, mean=4.22 [SD 1.70]) and finally the index of 
material well-being, which is derived by calculating the availability of seven items from the 
survey questionnaire (car, bank account, debit card, credit card, mobile phone, computer and 
access to internet at home) per household member (0=minimum, 7=maximum, mean=1.44 
[SD 1.25]).   
 
 
Results 
 
Bivariate analysis 
I start with presenting bivariate links between objective and subjective social mobility and 
attitudes toward income differences. To remind the reader, respondents are asked to express 
their views using a 10-point scale: “incomes should be made more equal”=1 versus “we need 
larger income differences”=10. To observe possible links between the dependent and 
independent variables Figure 1 presents scatterplots showing, for each country, the mean 
level of downward and upward mobility and the mean attitudes toward income differences. 
For objective mobility, Figures 1.1a and 1.1b, we do not observe any significant association 
between the mean levels of social mobility and the mean attitudes toward income differences, 
although Azerbaijan is a clear outlier with the significantly higher share of downward mobile 
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individuals. The variation in the mean values of subjective mobility is more pronounced for 
subjective mobility, but it is difficult to identify any significant association between the 
dependent and independent variables in Figures 1.2a and 1.2b. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
         
Next, I present separate box plots for the pooled samples of objective and subjective social 
mobility and the aggregated attitudes toward income differences. Box plots are useful tools 
for comparing results among separate groups as they show the lowest and highest terms in the 
sets, the median, the upper and the lower quartiles. The associations in Figure 2 derive from 
the pooled dataset for 21 countries and do not control for any covariates. For objective social 
mobility (see Figure 2a), I do not find significant differences between downwardly mobile 
(mean 5.77 [SD 3.04]) and non-mobile (mean 5.58 [SD 3.03]) individuals; however upwardly 
mobile (mean 5.65 [SD 3.00]) and strongly upward mobile (mean 5.86 [SD 2.96]) groups 
express slightly stronger preferences for larger income differences than non-mobile 
individuals. On the other hand, for subjective social mobility, we see that the dependent and 
independent variables appear to have a significant association, which is in line with 
Hypothesis 2. For strongly downward and non-mobile groups, a mean value of preferred 
income differences equals 4.10 (SD. 3.08) and 4.43 (SD 2.77), respectively, while the mean 
value is equal to 5.07 (SD. 3.14) for the strongly upward mobile group. The following 
multivariate analysis will show if identified patterns are affected by specific country effects 
and/or demographic and labour market characteristics of the analysed samples. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
19 
Multivariate analysis 
OLS models seem to be the most appropriate regression specification for our dependent 
variable as preferences on the income differences variable varies from 1 to 10. Following 
Kastellec and Leoni’s (2007) suggestion, the derived regression coefficients are presented 
graphically in Figure 3, which shows the point estimates with corresponding confidence 
intervals of two separate models for both subjective and objective social mobility. The first 
model only controls for country fixed-effects, while the second also accounts for the variation 
in the dependent variable stemming from respondents’ gender, age, education and labour 
market categories. Based on unreported nested analysis, in all models of objective and 
subjective social mobility most of the explained variation in attitudes toward income 
differences is attributed to country differences and Adjusted R2 values are not significantly 
affected by social mobility or socio-demographic variables. While a review of coefficients for 
control variables is not the main interest of this article, it is still interesting to note how they 
are associated with the dependent variable. In both objective and subjective social mobility 
models, education is positively related to attitudes concerning larger income differences and 
the coefficient is stronger in the regression for subjective social mobility (0.18, p<0.05 vs 
0.26, p<0.05). The unemployed are also less likely to prefer higher income gaps, as seen in 
Figures 3a and 3b, than individuals in the reference group, namely those who are employed. 
Regarding objective mobility, males express higher support for income differences (0.18, 
p<0.05). In the subjective mobility model, students tend to be more egalitarian than 
individuals in the reference group, namely those who not participating in the labour market. 
In both Figures 3a and 3b individuals not participating in the labour market are significant 
more egalitarian (-0.22, p<0.05 vs -0.19, p<0.01).  
Using dummy variables for upward and downward mobility, I am now able to test the 
validity of the proposed hypothesis regarding the net of country fixed-effects and individuals’ 
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demographic and labour market characteristics. For objective mobility (see Figure 3a), 
controlling for country fixed-effects only results in strongly upward mobile individuals 
showing higher support for increased income differences (0.21, p<.01). In Model 2, when the 
control variables are introduced to the regression, all social mobility dummies become 
statistically insignificant, which means that our Hypothesis 1 for objective social mobility is 
not supported. Nonetheless, subjective social mobility demonstrates strong association with 
attitudes toward income differences in Figure 3b. In fact, the control variables have little 
effect on the statistical and substantive significance of derived OLS coefficients. In Model 2, 
the upward and strongly upward mobile groups demonstrate a higher preference for larger 
gaps in income, 0.61 (p<.01) and 0.27 (p<.01) points, respectively. The coefficients for both 
downward and strongly downward mobile groups exhibit a negative sign, while the latter also 
maintains statistical significance at the 5% level. These results suggest that the proposed 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are confirmed only in terms of subjective social mobility with weak, if 
any, links between objective social mobility and attitudes toward income differences. The 
interpretation of these findings is discussed in the concluding section, but we can already 
infer that subjective perception of mobility is a much more important covariate of 
individuals’ attitudes toward income differences than objective mobility experience. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Additional controls and robustness of findings 
An obvious question concerns the robustness of the described findings. To further test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, I applied several alternative strategies. First, I tested what happens with 
the dummies on intergenerational social mobility when the presented OLS models include 
additional control variables. In the regression on objective social mobility, Model 1, Table 1, 
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the size of settlement, respondents’ socio-economic index of occupational status, and 
monthly household income corrected for purchasing power parity in euros are controlled. 
These additions did not affect the previously observed results – downward and upward 
occupational mobility is not systematically and significantly related to attitudes toward 
income inequality. For subjective social mobility, the type of settlement, index of material 
well-being and subjective socio-economic status are added to regression in Model 3. Even 
after including all these additional control variables in the OLS regression analysis, upwardly 
mobile individuals still strongly prefer larger income gaps, with a statistically significant 
association at the 1% level.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
  
Alternatively, for both objective and subjective mobility I analyse the effects on different but 
related dependent variables also concerned with redistribution. In Table 1, regarding an EVS 
question asking respondents whether or not individuals should take more responsibility for 
providing for themselves (1=“the state should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for”, 10=“individuals should take more responsibility for providing for 
themselves”, mean= 5.73 [SD 2.8]), OLS models were run with the same independent and 
control variables as in Figure 3. The latter test revealed that strongly upwardly mobile 
individuals are less likely than non-mobile individuals to believe that the state should take 
more responsibility for individual provisions, even after demographic and labour market 
characteristics are controlled for (p<.01). This is what we would expect for Hypothesis 1 – 
upwardly mobile individuals tend to believe that self-determining factors are responsible for 
life chances and therefore advocate for individual responsibility over an active role by the 
state in providing for everyone. One reason for finding statistically significant associations 
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with the latter dependent variable is that it is more closely related to personal responsibility 
and the self-serving bias in causal attributions among mobile individuals than to attitudes 
toward income differences. Nonetheless, the latter association vanishes when additional 
control variables discussed in the previous paragraph are accounted for.  
In reference to subjective mobility, on the other hand, the LITS survey asked 
respondents about their attitudes regarding ownership of business and industry 
(1=“government ownership of business and industry should be increased”, 10=“private 
ownership of business and industry should be increased”, mean= 5.42 [SD 2.9]). This 
variable is also a proxy indicator of support for redistribution as higher government 
ownership implies higher levels of equality; meanwhile, the opposite is found when private 
ownership is preferred. The results indicate that the downward mobile group is less likely, 
and the upwardly mobile group more likely, to think that private ownership of business and 
industry should be increased, which again is in line with Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, in order 
to address the “ceiling” and “floor” effect more comprehensively in the unreported analysis I 
tested the same regressions as shown in Table 1, but this time restricting the sample 
separately for the bottom, middle and top tertiles of parental ISEI score. Lastly, for both 
objective and subjective social mobility I eliminated from the analysis all individuals aged 34 
years or below as the existing research suggests that individuals only achieve their mature 
social statues by their mid-30s (Bukodi, Goldthorpe, Waller, & Kuha, 2015). In both tests, the 
main findings remained unaffected. 
 
Social mobility and cross-national differences in egalitarian attitudes? 
Based on the reported main analysis and the robustness checks, I can assert that objective 
social mobility has no association with preferences for income differences. But the results 
also indicate that in post-socialist societies, subjective social mobility has strong and 
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statistically significant association with the dependent variable under consideration. In this 
final empirical section, I test whether or not the country-level differences in egalitarian 
attitudes, shown in Figure 1, can be explained out by accounting for individuals’ subjective 
mobility experience. By specifying country fixed-effects in the main analysis, I cancelled out 
the variation in the dependent variables coming from specific societies, but the findings of the 
study with such a large sample of countries might differ if separate countries or country 
groups are analysed. There have been attempts to incorporate post-communist countries into 
a welfare state typology (Aidukaite, 2009; Fenger, 2007; Gugushvili, 2010, 2015b) and the 
varieties of capitalism frameworks (Adam, Kristan, & Tomšič, 2009; Bohle & Greskovits, 
2007, 2012). The problem with using the latter typologies is that the links between these 
approaches, social mobility regimes and egalitarian attitudes are not quite clear. Additionally, 
these country classifications generally cover only a small portion of the countries in the 
broader post-socialist region.  
In addition to analysing the effect of social mobility on differences in egalitarian 
attitudes between separate countries, a straightforward categorisation of post-socialist 
societies can be derived from annual Transitional Reports of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), in which economic reforms are described 
separately in (1) Central Europe and the Baltic states; (2) South-Eastern Europe; and (3) 
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.7 Figure 4 depicts regression coefficients for country 
dummy variables and country groups from three separate OLS models. Model 1 does not 
include any other independent variables than those shown in graphs, Model 2 accounts for the 
socio-demographic and labour market characteristics described in section on control 
                                                          
7 The first group includes Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, the second group includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia; while the third group includes the former Soviet Union 
republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. 
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variables, while Model 3 also includes the subjective social mobility experience of 
individuals.  
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The rationale of the test presented in Figure 4 is the following: if the coefficients for countries 
and country groups move substantially and significantly toward zero when social mobility 
variable is introduced in the regression models, we can conclude that subjective social 
mobility is the significant explanation of variance in egalitarian attitudes among post-socialist 
societies. Nonetheless, both Figures 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate that the introduction of 
subjective social mobility in Model 3 does little to affect the association between dummy 
variables on countries/country groups and attitudes toward income differences. In fact, the 
95% confidence intervals between Models 2 and 3 overlap in all instances, which suggests 
that although subjective perception of social mobility is significant predictor of individual-
level attitudes toward income differences within countries, it cannot account for the country-
level variance in egalitarian attitudes. The key reason why I do not report the similar test for 
objective social mobility is that the main results of this article suggest that there is no 
association between objective intergenerational mobility and attitudes toward income 
differences.  
 
  
Conclusions 
The presented study analysed how social mobility experience associates with attitudes toward 
income differences in transition societies. For this purpose, I mainly relied on social 
psychology literature and the concept of self-serving bias in causal attribution. The derived 
hypothesis implied that people are more likely to explain failures by causal factors beyond 
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their control and successes by individual merit, abilities and effort, and therefore justify 
greater rewards and larger income differences. It can be assumed that individuals start with 
an initial set of attitudes that are amended according to their personal experience of social 
mobility and the self-serving bias in perceptions about the role of ascribed and attained 
factors related to success or failure. I also looked at the consequences of both objective and 
subjective social mobility assuming that subjective mobility would have a stronger 
association with the analysed dependent variable.   
In line with the proposed theoretical framework, the substantive results demonstrate 
that subjectively downward mobile individuals are less likely, and the upward mobile groups 
more likely, to support greater income differences, but that objective social mobility has little 
effect on preferences for income differentiation. Indeed, one of the central findings is that 
what really matters in the formation of attitudes is not an objective occupational upgrade in 
status (conventional measures of social mobility) but rather how people perceive their own 
mobility experience. Nonetheless, we do not find that subjective social mobility can explain 
out county-level differences in egalitarian attitudes. The reported findings are well aligned 
with an observation made by Lipset (1992) that subjective perception of mobility has stronger 
implications on political attitudes than objective mobility experience, with similar findings 
having been reported in earlier literature on status inconsistency (Baer, Eitzen, Duprey, 
Thompson, & Cole, 1976). Compared with objective social status, subjective self-placement 
in the social hierarchy was also closely related to health-related factors (Adler, Epel, 
Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). Relative expectations might also play a role in the importance 
of subjective over objective social mobility because those who consider themselves upward 
or downward mobile, unlike objectively mobile individuals, are more likely to express 
varying attitudes toward income differences (Whyte, 2010). 
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 One of the main caveats of the presented study is that the employed data and methods 
do not allow for an unequivocal assertion that the observed associations are the result of a 
self-serving bias in causal attributions as our Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest. At least two 
alternative explanations of the findings can be proposed. First, the possibility of reverse 
causation cannot be excluded in the revealed associations since we do not have a longitudinal 
dataset. It could be that upwardly mobile individuals had the same attitudes before they 
experienced upward mobility and that individualistic personalities contributed both to their 
successes in life and attitudes toward income differences. Although the latter problem cannot 
be addressed in this article, most of the studies in the field have faced similar constraints, 
which have not prevented them from making associative conclusions. In addition, several 
longitudinal studies suggest that changes in attitudes do occur over time and along with social 
mobility experience (Clark & D’Angelo, 2010; Marshall & Firth, 1999). The second 
explanation for the observed results is individual rational self-interest. Upward mobility 
increases the chances of people becoming net contributors in the public redistributive system, 
while downward mobility diminishes this probability. This problem is mitigated but not 
eliminated when a wide array of control variables is accounted for, as shown in Figure 3 and 
Table 1. Another important caveat of this study is that for the comparison of the effects of 
objective and subjective social mobility on attitudes toward income differences is based on 
the samples from two different surveys that were collected between 2008-2010 and therefore 
might be affected differently by the major economic recession in post-socialist societies.  
 Lastly, it is interesting to consider the possible implications of social mobility for 
social policies in post-socialist countries and beyond. First of all, the rates of objective social 
mobility across countries are not drastically different. In addition, this type of mobility does 
not exert a particularly strong influence on welfare attitudes; whereas subjective social 
mobility displays much stronger links with attitudes toward income differences. As the 
27 
hypothesis on the relationship between objective mobility and attitudes to income 
differentials is not validated, the main implication of the described findings for the realm of 
social policy is that the recent vivid discourse in political and media circles on the declining 
trends in social mobility in Western welfare democracies, and particularly in the United 
Kingdom (Goldthorpe, 2013), might have more normative implications rather than specific 
political consequences with regard to voting behaviour or social movements. The recent 
evidence in the British context (see Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2015) also suggests that 
educational policies may have only a limited effect on intergenerational social mobility. What 
appears to matter more are the equality of conditions and opportunities and boosting “top-
end” jobs in the structure of occupational hierarchy; however, the latter areas are usually out 
of the politicians’ relative comfort zone of educational policy and are much more difficult to 
amend through social and public policies (Goldthorpe, 2013).  
Subjective social mobility, in turn, in addition to objectively experienced mobility, is 
closely related to an individual’s current socioeconomic status and “sociotropic” attitudes 
related to the broader economic and social developments in their home countries (Kelley & 
Kelley, 2009). This might imply that in societies with strong economies subjectively mobile 
individuals are less likely to support income differences and social policies that help the poor. 
In new post-socialist democracies, with high levels of subjective mobility, governments have 
to take into account median voter preferences and, as a result, social policies can become less 
egalitarian. There is a strong indication that the latter phenomenon reduces social mobility in 
the long run (Esping-Andersen, 2004). In a way, social mobility and resultant egalitarian 
attitudes can create a loop in which an increase in the former leads to a decrease in the latter 
and vice versa. Beyond transition societies, the advanced welfare democracies in Western 
Europe and North America might be interesting cases for exploring the links between social 
mobility and welfare state development because in the last few decades they have 
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experienced significant changes in the intergenerational reproduction of occupational status 
with corresponding shifts in egalitarian attitudes and reforms in social policies.  
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Figure 1: Downward and upward mobility and attitudes toward income differences in 21 post-socialist 
societies 
 
Source: EVS (2008) and LITS (2010). 
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Figure 2: Bivariate associations between social mobility and attitudes toward income differences 
 
Notes: Box plots show the lowest and highest terms in the sets, the median, the upper quartile, and the 
lower quartile. Source: EVS (2008) for objective mobility and LITS (2010) for subjective mobility. 
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Figure 3: Intergenerational social mobility and attitudes toward income differences [“Incomes should 
be made more equal”=1, “we need larger income differences”=10]. Coefficients from OLS models 
 
Notes: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Robust standard errors are calculated. Models control 
for country fixed-effects. Reference categories are non-mobile individuals, female, employed 
individuals. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from EVS (2008) for objective mobility and 
LITS (2010) for subjective mobility. 
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Figure 4: Social mobility and county-level differences in attitudes toward income differences 
[“Incomes should be made more equal”=1, “we need larger income differences”=10]. Coefficients 
from OLS models 
Notes: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Robust standard errors are calculated. Reference 
categories are Armenia in Figure 4a and Central Europe and the Baltic states in Figure 4b. Source: 
Author’s calculations based on data from EVS (2008) for objective mobility and LITS (2010) for 
subjective mobility. 
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Table 1: Intergenerational social mobility and attitudes toward income differences, individuals’ 
responsibilities and type of preferred ownership. Coefficients from OLS models 
 Objective social mobility Subjective social mobility 
   Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
 Attitudes toward 
income 
differences 
Attitudes toward 
individuals 
taking more 
responsibility for 
themselves 
Attitudes toward 
income 
differences 
Attitudes toward 
ownership of 
business and 
industry 
Intercept    5.21 (0.27)***   4.88 (0.24)***   3.19 (0.22)***   6.33 (0.22)*** 
Social mobility     
Strongly downward  –0.13 (0.10) –0.14 (0.09) –0.04 (0.08) –0.16 (0.08)* 
Downward   0.06 (0.07) –0.11 (0.07) –0.04 (0.06) –0.14 (0.06)** 
Non-mobile   Reference   Reference   Reference   Reference 
Upward   0.03 (0.07)   0.06 (0.06)   0.23 (0.05)***   0.04 (0.05) 
Strongly upward  –0.00 (0.09)   0.19 (0.07)***   0.51 (0.08)***   0.38 (0.08)*** 
Basic controls      
Male    0.19 (0.05)***   0.36 (0.05)***   0.03 (0.04)   0.17 (0.04)*** 
Age   0.01 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01)   0.00 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01)* 
Age2/100 –0.01 (0.01)   0.00 (0.01) –0.01 (0.01)   0.00 (0.01) 
Education   0.13 (0.03)***   0.16 (0.02)***   0.19 (0.02)***   0.11 (0.02)*** 
Unemployed –0.24 (0.09)** –0.40 (0.08)*** –0.11 (0.07) –0.21 (0.07)*** 
Student   0.14 (0.24) –0.38 (0.21)*   0.13 (0.11)   0.11 (0.11) 
Retired –0.05 (0.09) –0.22 (0.08)** –0.16 (0.06)** –0.36 (0.07)*** 
Other labour market status –0.15 (0.10) –0.31 (0.09)*** –0.10 (0.06) –0.07 (0.06) 
Additional controls     
Size of settlement   0.03 (0.01)***   ….   ….   …. 
Respondents ISEI   0.00 (0.00)*   ….   ….   …. 
Monthly household income   0.05 (0.03)   ….   ….   …. 
Urban settlement   ….   ….   0.18 (0.04)***   …. 
Index of material well-being   ….   ….   0.13 (0.02)***   …. 
Subjective socio-economic 
status 
  ….   ….   0.14 (0.01)***   …. 
Statistics     
AIC   67,089   77,570   100,288   99,084 
BIC   67,360   77,823   100,573   99,345 
Number of observations   13,813   16,015   20,540   20,243 
Adjusted R2   0.166   0.062   0.137   0.076 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Models control for country fixed-effects. Reference categories are non-
mobile individuals, female, employed individuals. Source: EVS (2008) for objective mobility and 
LITS (2010) for subjective mobility. 
